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Types Of Disagreement In Philosophy

Independence: Reasons for neglecting your peer`s opinion on the opinion of , (P) must be independent of the disagreement itself. Another question is whether the actual disagreements of their peers are the only disagreements with epistemtic meaning. Suppose you`ve created an argument that you`ll find in the solitude of your office. If you think about what your colleague (peer) would think, you reasonably agree that she would not agree with the benefits of your argument. If such a conclusion is reasonable for you, then it seems that this fact should have epistemic consequences for you, even if (at least so far) there is no real disagreement. Such a simple difference of opinion probably has the same epistemic meaning as a real disagreement (see Carey – Matheson 2013). Similarly, if a bad tyrant believes ” (P) and then decides to eliminate all colleagues disagreeing who do not believe that he would not be justified by his previously challenged conviction (Kelly 2005). One of the challenges is to identify differences of opinion that are only epistemically significant, because at the risk of global skepticism, not all of them (Barnett and Li 2017). Issues related to counterfactual disagreements are also discussed at Ballantyne 2013b, Bogardus 2016 and Morgensen in 2016. One might wonder why epismologists have focused on the epistemic importance of disagreements with their peers. Finally, there is good reason to believe that there is simply no disagreement among one`s peers in the world. While the world is full of disagreements, there is usually at least one epistemde advantage held by one of the parties: one of them has a little more evidence, one of them has a little more thought about, one of them is a little more open-minded, and so on.

Disagreements between their peers are therefore a very idealized type of disagreement. It is perhaps mysterious that, while the epistemmatic importance of differences of opinion is often motivated by the focus on political, religious, scientific and philosophical differences in the real world, the debate is rapidly evolving into highly ideological cases of peer differences of opinion. Other objections to the “equal weight” opinion are not related to another specific view of differences of opinion, and some are more than mere “equal weight” view. In this section, we briefly examine some of these objections. For example, I might have an opinion on the nature of free will or the moral admissibility of the death penalty or on the existence of God.

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